G20 summit: Africa’s loss

Robert Kappel, Helmut Reisen | 14.07.2017

IPS Journal, 17 July, 2017
Full text here: http://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/africa/article/show/g20-summit-africas-loss-2167/
EPA/ Armando Babani

EPA/ Armando Babani
Outcomes of the G20 summit vanished into thin air.
Now the troubled days in Hamburg are over, it’s time to ask what’s left from last weekend’s G20 summit. Controversial discussions about a unified climate policy, free trade and better measures to combat terrorism overshadowed the Compact with Africa (CWA) – a G20 initiative to promote private investment on the continent. It was an opportunity missed – not least due to a lack of empathy from the USA, EU, Japan and India, as well as China. It seems this ‘club of rich nations’ is still only marginally concerned that African countries are underdeveloped and not part of the global economy.

The G20 finance ministers coordinated the CWA, and discussed it with select African countries after it had been completed. Then the G20 approved it. But its name, Compact with Africa is misleading. The continent was barely involved in shaping the agreement. South Africa is the only African member of the G20. The African Union was invited late in the day, and no other African countries were involved in formulating the Compact. Besides that, as a document that links the financing of large infrastructure projects to foreign direct investment, the CWA does not really represent African concerns.
The G20 finance ministers who ran the show in Hamburg mostly thought about how to free up capital for big projects. We’re talking huge sums: To catch up with Southeast Asian infrastructure, an estimated USD 100 billion will have to be invested annually over 10 to 15 years. And that only covers the bare necessities – electricity, roads, water connections, urban and rural transport systems, ports and airports.
Since sums of that magnitude are beyond the means of official development assistance, the G20 is hoping to attract private investors such as pension funds and life insurers. However, they will only invest where they have good prospects of a certain rate of return. This is unrealistic in poor African countries, so there still need to be subsidies and safeguards. Compact documents reveal that investors are guaranteed interest rates of 4 to 4.5 per cent.
A Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung study about the CWA from May 2017 (Kappel, Reisen 2017) analysed its main components. Although the CWA’s concept is perfectly coherent and it presents straightforward arguments and some important statements about efficiency, big-project management and possible indebtedness, the authors of the study criticise that in the final analysis, the CWA is a re-launch of the ‘Big Push’. That approach, which predicts that Africa could get ahead through major investment in its infrastructure, has already been discussed many times in Africa. The Compact is simply a new version of stabilisation and structural adjustment measures: The generally detrimental programmes of the 1990s are in vogue again.
The CWA is principally a set of instruments for leveraging private capital and hedging risks. The idea is not new. It plays down the side effects and barriers that private co-financing can cause, especially in poor countries and conflict-wracked regions where poverty persists and creates the greatest pressure to migrate.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and African Development Bank provided the blueprint for the compact. Unsurprisingly, the compact is biased.
Its macroeconomic framework – fiscal policy discipline, privatisation and deregulation – smacks of the neoliberal ‘Washington Consensus’ that was thought to be a thing of the past. The CWA has no room for nuanced recommendations that take Africa’s particularities into consideration. It does not distinguish between emerging economies and conflict-ridden poorhouses; countries that export and import raw materials; coastal states or landlocked countries; states in West and East Africa; or nations that are heavily indebted and those that are not.
The CWA is heavily influenced by the Anglo-Saxon financial model, which is based on stocks and bonds. In contrast to that, East Asia and Continental Europe financed their successful development models through retained corporate profits, commercial bank corporate credits, and taxes and mandatory levies for public sector investment.
The public sector’s role in development is largely ignored: salvation is supposed to come from private investors. There is no mention of the role played by national development banks for the middle class, state pension funds and rural credit unions in combatting rural poverty.
The CWA also overlooks the connection between developing infrastructure, industry and agriculture. There is no concept for developing industry, modernising agriculture, or the economic policies needed to do that. Knowledge of the varying developments in middle- and low-income countries, where small- and medium-sized enterprises have vastly different starting positions, is particularly lacking. Neither does the compact explain how the momentum that developing industry can gain in urban centres can be brought into the agricultural sector.
The CWA does not address the benefits of education and training on economic development, nor does it discuss labour or environmental standards – areas where Germany has expertise.
With the G20 finance ministers dictating the agenda, the German government missed its chance to bring African countries’ experience, strategy papers, expertise and economic policy concepts into the discussion.
Germany also missed the opportunity to present a new model of cooperation with Africa, despite numerous conversations between African leaders and German ministers, NGOs, think tanks, unions, employer associations and political parties. There was no discussion of the German government’s “Marshall Plan for Africa”, which proposed a number of initiatives to fight poverty. There should have been more of a focus on poverty and climate change, because Africa needs sustainable and inclusive development.
The G20 heads of state and government are astonishingly resistant to advice about how to cooperate with Africa. They seem to cling to an obsolete, neo-colonial and paternalistic model of control – a model that is more likely to exacerbate the problems than solve them. Small wonder that African countries want no part of it!Germany must now lick its wounds and start over. Its next opportunity will be at the autumn 2017 negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement, which has regulated the partnership between African countries and the EU since 2000 and is scheduled to end in 2020. Hopefully, those results will not be paternalistic or made with brute-force. We have to hope that the next agreement will be pro-active and include convincing measures for solving complex trade issues. The Hamburg takeaway: Never allow finance ministers to conceptualise issues that are beyond them: development, poverty reduction, industrialisation, agricultural modernisation and employment. 


Robert Kappel and Helmut Reisen (2017), The G20 »Compact with Africa« – Unsuitable for African Low-Income Countries, Berlin: FES. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13441.pdf

Robert Kappel, Birte Pfeiffer and Helmut Reisen (2017), Compact with Africa: Fostering Private Long-term Investment in Africa, Bonn: GDI/DIE Discussion Paper 17/2017. http://www.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/compact-with-africa-fostering-private-long-term-investment-in-africa/

Compact with Africa: Fostering Private Long-Term Investment

DSC02487.JPGT20 Blog of German Development Institute, Bonn

link to original blog contribution: http://blog.t20germany.org/2017/02/09/compact-with-africa-fostering-private-long-term-investment/

Birte Pfeiffer, Helmut Reisen and Robert Kappel

The German G20 Presidency puts the spotlight on Africa’s economic development. In its ´Compact with Africa´, the German G20 Presidency, jointly with the African partners, wants to encourage institutional investment by pension funds and life insurers in infrastructure to encourage corporate direct investment. The objective of the “Compact with Africa” is to boost growth and jobs, promote inclusion and give people economic opportunities at home so that they do not have to leave their home country to seek subsistence elsewhere.

Foreign direct investment (FDI), building on institutional infrastructure investment, can foster structural transformation with employment creation. The G20 should help make private investment in Africa more attractive by making it more secure, and reducing the barriers to investment. How can the G20 move forward? The G20 should engage in a coordinated dialogue with the regulatory authorities and the Financial Stability Board to remove supply-side barriers to higher institutional investment in infrastructure. Host-country conditions in the poorest African countries, however, do not lend themselves easily to institutional investment, even with strong blending support by development finance institutions.

Both institutional investments by pension funds, life insurers, as well as corporate FDI can benefit Africa. Institutional investors enjoy long-term liabilities in their balance sheets, essential to fund Africa´s infrastructure, a central growth prerequisite for the continent. FDI, in turn, requires modern infrastructure, especially energy and connectivity, to fully deploy its external benefits. FDI can entail spillovers for the modernization of production capacity; knowledge transfer; integration into global and regional value chains; as well as employment for the jobless.

Fill Africa’s infrastructure funding gap

To fill Africa´s annual infrastructure funding gap of $50 billion[1], one percent of new institutional investment by pension funds, life insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds would need to be invested in Africa´s infrastructure every year. Yet, despite the longstanding policy focus of G8 and G20 leaders, private institutional investment still plays a minority role in funding Africa´s infrastructure.

Regulatory supply-side barriers and stable profit margins explain why life insurers and pension funds mostly have stayed in the comfort zone of liquid bond and equity markets. Ultimately, encouraging long-term investment of pension funds and life insurers in infrastructure – including in Africa – will need the G20 to engage in a coordinated dialogue with the regulatory authorities and the Financial Stability Board (FSB)—the international body of finance ministers, central bankers, and other agencies established in 2009 after the global financial crisis.

G20 should envisage a prominent role for private institutional investors once barriers are removed

Most African countries remain poor, have immature domestic financial markets, and have recently featured deteriorating scores of safety and rule of law. This holds particularly in those low-income countries, such as in the Sahel Zone, where present demographic and future migration pressures remain extremely high. Common infrastructure project risks (completion, performance, revenue, financing, maintenance and operation risks) weigh also particularly in low-income Africa. In low-income Africa, a prominent role of private institutional investors should be envisaged only once the discussed host-country barriers have been largely removed.

Despite policy efforts to mobilize private finance through official development finance interventions, they so far have represented a small fraction of the flows directed to low-income Africa. The central dilemma: low domestic savings, weak government finances and a low debt tolerance militate against forcing foreign private debt and contingent fiscal liabilities upon low-income African countries where infrastructure deficits are most blatant. Grants, remittances and FDI equity finance should be preferred over debt-creating finance as the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) debt sustainability assessments have deteriorated in a number of Africa´s countries, not least due to public infrastructure commitments.

Integration in value chains foster absorption of technology and promote inclusive growth

FDI inflows produce important effects which go beyond spillovers to domestic firms. They are contributing to structural change, but the effects of different FDI inflows vary (FDI in resource-driven countries vs. consumer-market oriented industries). The shift of FDI to consumer-sectors has created jobs, mainly low-skilled.[2] Some middle-income African countries have managed to enter global value chains. Generally, a stronger integration of African countries into global value chains may foster the absorption of technology and build skills, and promote inclusive growth. But so far the transfer of technology and spillover effects are still limited.

FDI in manufacturing, construction, trade services, in transport, ICT etc. have experienced growing employment and positive labor productivity growth. This is mainly the case in urban hubs and in sectors which are integrated in global and regional value chains. Generally, stronger integration of African countries into GVCs may foster the absorption of technology and skills from FDI and thereby enhance structural change and promote inclusive growth.

Policy measures which drive structural transformation in Africa

Based on the analysis of trends and the channels that are expected to drive structural transformation in Africa, the following policy measures are key:

Macroeconomic and political stability and attractive general investment conditions are prerequisites for long-term growth. Regulatory quality and a positive overall institutional environment are important in attracting FDI and stimulating domestic enterprises.
Policies that deepen complementarities between FDI and domestic investment should be promoted to ensure sustainable growth. The development of backward linkages and local supply chains depends on creating a favourable investment climate for both local firms and foreign investors. Strong FDI linkages with the domestic economy result in greater diffusion of knowledge, technology, and know-how from foreign investors. An important channel for potential spillovers is the collaboration of foreign investors with local institutions.[3]
Reaping the benefits of global value chain integration depends upon industrial policy reform. Shifting the focus from national industry development to deeper integration into global value chains is essential.[4] African economies can benefit most by specializing in particular segments of a value chain. Governments can foster foreign firms to create linkages with domestic suppliers through tax incentives and local content requirements.
Agglomeration economies can be utilized in cities and industrial clusters.[5] These are important for increasing firm production. Innovative and competitive clusters can be drivers for more FDI. Clusters and networks between enterprises have particular significance for the industrial take-off. Improving job creation in small and medium sized enterprises requires barriers being removed, enabling them to grow, and supporting young people to become entrepreneurs. Start-up programmes, funds for young entrepreneurs, and business services can drive innovation and job creation.
Regional economic integration is essential for Africa to utilize its full growth potential. Many countries profit from stronger intraregional cooperation, connectivity, regional market expansion, all of which makes African markets attractive to local and foreign investors. Intraregional investment in infrastructure will reduce trade and transportation costs, foster competitiveness, and facilitate regional value chains and integration into global value chains as well as technology transfers to local entrepreneurs.
The limited penetration of long-term finance in African markets is of particular concern given the huge long-term investment needs of African economies.

High growth rates and FDI inflows are not necessarily accompanied by a structural transformation towards a modern economy and, in turn, the creation of jobs in industry. Many African economies are still resource dominant, and FDI inflows are mainly resource driven. Some countries have very low FDI inflows and some others started attracting consumer-driven FDI inflows. The recent trend of FDI inflows in the manufacturing sector show that these are more employment intensive and change the African transformation process. They indicate an initial shift in production and employment pattern in some African countries and especially in urban hubs. But some African countries can be trapped in low value-added manufacturing with little positive spillovers and limited employment effects.

See also: Helmut Reisen: Pakt mit Afrika oder Deal für die Allianz?



[1] Kappel, Robert, Birte Pfeiffer and Helmut Reisen (2017), Compact with Africa. Fostering Private-Long-term Investment, Bonn: DIE Discussion Paper.

[2] Bhorat, Haroon & Finn Tarp (2016). Africa’s Lions: Growth Traps and Opportunities for Six African Economies, Washington, D.C.

[3] Deloitte (2016). Foreign Direct Investment and Inclusive Growth. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-dttl-FDI-and-inclusive-growth.pdf; Staritz, Cornelia & Frederick Stacey (2016). Harnessing Foreign Direct Investment for Local Development? Spillovers in Apparel Global Value Chains in Sub-Saharan Africa, Vienna ÖFSE Working Paper 59. http://www.oefse.at/fileadmin/content/Downloads/Publikationen/Workingpaper/WP59_FDI-spillovers-SSA-apparel.pdf.

[4] UNECA & African Union (2014). Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2014, Addis Ababa. http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/final_era2014_march25_en.pdf.

[5] AfDB, OECD & UNEP, (2016). African Outlook 2016. Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation, Paris.

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Rise of the „African Mittelstand“

Robert Kappel

Rise of the „African Mittelstand“

GIGA Focus | Africa | Number 05 |November 2016 | ISSN 1862-3603

On the African continent, a few powerful large companies dominate, and there is an overwhelming number of mostly informal micro- and small businesses; however, African entrepreneurship is diverse and increasing urbanisation has been accompanied by the emergence of modern enterprises, which constitute an “African Mittelstand.”

  • The rise of an entrepreneurial Mittelstand in Africa is being fuelled by the growing income of the middle classes in Africa’s cities, where industrial clusters are developing. Many Mittelstand enterprises have even managed to integrate themselves into global or regional value chains.
  • Engineers and skilled workers are particularly important for industrial innovation processes and for the development of an “African Mittelstand.” In the urban centres, companies can draw on a growing pool of skilled workers.
  • Both Uganda and Nigeria have a rather small middle classes and low numbers of Mittelstand enterprises, whereas Tunisia has a very large middle class. Nevertheless, large export-oriented enterprises are prevalent in Tunisia, and its Mittelstand is extremely small.
  • Due to numerous obstacles, a Mittelstand cannot develop optimally in Africa. These hindrances include inadequate financial and legal systems, a lack of electricity and water supply, and a system of “favouritism,” whereby large enterprises receive government contracts, while small and medium-sized enterprises are usually awarded nothing.

Policy Implications

In Africa the expansion of modern entrepreneurship in its growing urban centres and the increasing purchasing power of its middle classes could initiate growth momentum, which would also lead to higher employment. However, this will require that governments promote the development of industrial clusters and eliminate the numerous obstacles facing small and medium-sized enterprises.

Die Bevölkerung wächst stark an: Afrika in der malthusianischen Falle?

Sommer 2016 545

Die Bevölkerung wächst stark an: Afrika in der malthusianischen Falle?

Robert Kappel

Fluchtursachen lassen sich nicht wirksam bekämpfen, weder kurz- noch mittelfristig. Es wird immer wieder neue Flüchtlingsströme geben. Flüchtlinge lassen sich nicht aufhalten, wenn Kriege, Gewalt, Umweltkrisen und Perspektivlosigkeit in ihren Heimatländern sie vertreiben.

Was noch viel gravierender ist: Das Bevölkerungswachstum in Afrika ist extrem hoch, d.h. in Zukunft werden noch mehr Menschen fliehen. Zahlen des Berliner Instituts für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung und der UN verdeutlichen, dass die Menschen wegen der stark ansteigenden afrikanischen Bevölkerungen innerhalb Afrikas flüchten und/oder den Weg nach Europa (und nicht nach Saudi Arabien, China oder Russland) gehen. Franziska Woellert und Rainer Klingholz schreiben: „Das Hauptproblem ist, dass das Bevölkerungswachstum viel schneller ist als das Jobwachstum“.[1]

Es ist hilfreich, sich erneut auf eine alte und doch sehr aktuelle Diskussion zur Bevölkerungsentwicklung und –politik zu besinnen. Der Ökonom und Pastor Thomas Robert Malthus stellte in seinem „Principle of Population“ (ursprünglich 1798)[2] die These auf, dass die Bevölkerungszahl geometrisch wachse, die Nahrungsmittelproduktion aber nur arithmetisch. Das habe zur Folge, dass das Nahrungsmittelangebot und die -nachfrage sich auseinanderentwickelten. Nahrungsmittelpreise müssten daher steigen und die Reallöhne auf ein Subsistenzniveau sinken. Fehlen preventive checks zur Senkung der Geburtenrate (z. B. durch Verhütungsmaßnahmen), seien positive checks zur Steigerung der Sterblichkeit (z. B. Hungerkatastrophen) unvermeidlich. Dieses „Bevölkerungsgesetz“ hat sich weltweit betrachtet als relativ ungültig erwiesen. Für Afrika (und auch den Nahen Osten) hat das Malthusische Gesetz jedoch Bedeutung, neben vielen anderen Faktoren, die in der Entwicklungsökonomie immer wieder debattiert werden (struktureller Wandel, Rolle von Institutionen, Wachstumsmodell usw usf).

Malthus plädierte für Enthaltsamkeit, späte Heirat und für Investitionen in die Bildung als Instrumente zur Senkung der Geburtenrate. Die Hebung des allgemeinen Bildungsstandes sei ein besonders wichtiger Beitrag zur Reduzierung des Bevölkerungswachstums. Bildungsoffensiven für die unteren Schichten der Gesellschaft würden die größten Erträge bringen.

Das afrikanische Bevölkerungswachstum ist in den meisten Ländern im Durchschnitt der letzten dreißig Jahre nur wenig geringer als das Wirtschaftswachstum und das Wachstum der Nahrungsmittelproduktion. Die meist unproduktive Landwirtschaft kann die arme Bevölkerung Afrikas nicht ausreichend ernähren, die Böden sind ausgelaugt, die meisten Farmer sind von den Märkten abgekoppelt. Daher steigen die Nahrungsmittelimporte nach Afrika stark an.

Tabelle 1: Bevölkerungsentwicklung in Afrika 1950-2100, Tausend

1950 2015 2030 2050 2100
Äthiopien 18 128 99 391 138 297 188 455 242 644
Angola 4 355 25 022 39 351 65 473 138 738
Burundi 2 309 11 179 17 357 28 668 62 662
DR Congo 12 184 77 267 120 304 195 277 388 733
Malawi 2 954 17 215 26 584 43 155 87 056
Mali 4 708 17 600 27 370 45 404 92 981
Niger 2 560 19 899 35 966 72 238 209 334
Somalia 2 264 10 787 16 493 27 030 58 311
Uganda 5 158 39 032 61 929 101 873 202 868
Tanzania 7 650 53 470 82 927 137 136 299 133
Zambia 2 317 16 212 25 313 42 975 104 869

Quelle: UN (2015), World Population Prospects, New York. https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf

Die afrikanischen Gesellschaften sind in der malthusianischen Falle steckengeblieben, in der technologischer Fortschritt (bspw. durch Medikamente, Ausbau der Gesundheitssysteme) für mehr Bevölkerungswachstum sorgte, der Lebensstandard aber gering blieb. Erst in den letzten Jahren ist dieser gestiegen, aber manch ein Land hat trotz des Wachstums des letzten Jahrzehnts noch nicht einmal das Durchschnittseinkommen der 1960er Jahre erreicht. Erfolgsmeldungen über die relative Reduktion der Armut täuschen über die wachsende absolute Zahl der Armen hinweg, die von weniger als 2 USD überleben müssen.

In Afrika verzeichnen nur wenige Länder eine demografische Transition mit einem Sinken der Geburtenrate, bspw. die Kap Verden oder Mauritius. In den meisten Ländern liegt das Bevölkerungswachstum über 2,7%. In 28 afrikanischen Ländern wird sich die Bevölkerung von 2010 bis 2050 verdoppeln (vgl. eine Auswahl von afrikanischen Ländern in Tabelle 1). Im Jahr 2050 dürfte die Zahl der Menschen bei zwei Milliarden liegen. Diese Entwicklung ist auch mit großen Umweltzerstörungen verbunden.


Unruhen und bewaffnete Konflikte

Das Hauptproblem Afrikas ist, so Woellner/Klingholz 2016: „dass sich bis 2050 die Bevölkerung verdoppelt, aber nicht annähernd so viele neue Arbeitsplätze auf die Menschen warten.“ Daher leide der Kontinent unter zwei besonderen Defiziten: „Erstens können sich die meisten der afrikanischen Länder nicht selbst ernähren und sind von Nahrungsmitteleinfuhren abhängig. Zweitens müssen viele Staaten Afrikas Energie importieren … Allein zwischen 2010 und 2020 werden rund 120 Millionen junge Menschen zusätzlich auf den ohnehin überfüllten Arbeitsmarkt drängen… Ein großer Bevölkerungsanteil junger Menschen ist ein Segen für eine Volkswirtschaft, wenn diese Menschen eine angemessene Beschäftigung finden. Gelingt dies nicht, ist die Gefahr groß, dass der Jugendüberhang zu Unruhen und bewaffneten Konflikten führt.“

Schauen wir die Länder der Tabelle 1 an, so haben viele bereits etliche Bürgerkriege erlebt bzw. befinden sich in sehr konfliktiven Auseinandersetzungen (Burundi, Uganda, Somalia, DR Kongo, Mali, Angola und auch die nicht aufgelisteten Länder Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mosambik, die ebenfalls ein hohes Bevölkerungswachstum aufweisen). Die Wahrscheinlichkeit neuer interner Konflikte und Kriege zwischen den Ländern ist extrem hoch, und gerade Länder, die bereits Bürgerkriege durchgemacht haben, sind besonders anfällig für neue gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen. Hier funktionieren die Institutionen schlechter und hier haben neo-patrimoniale Regime ihre Macht für ihren eigenen Vorteil gesucht. Und hier ist der Anteil der jungen Menschen an der Bevölkerung extrem hoch. Sie bekommen keine Jobs und organisieren sich neu, sie flüchten, sie überleben im informellen Sektor, sie bilden Gangs, bewegen sich in kriminellen Milieus oder schließen sich terroristischen oder radikalen Gruppen an, sei es im Niger-Delta, sei es Boko Haram, Al Shabab. Die Gefahren für innerstaatliche Konflikte und Bürgerkriege werden durch die extrem ansteigenden Bevölkerungen größer. Besonders wahrscheinlich sind gegenwärtig Auseinandersetzungen in Uganda, Somalia, Liberia und Äthiopien.

Es ist vor allem die Aufgabe der einzelnen afrikanischen Länder, das hohe Bevölkerungswachstum zu reduzieren. Ein Vergleich mit dem Aufstieg Chinas während der letzten 30 Jahre bzw. mit dem Vietnams oder auch lateinamerikanischen Ländern zeigt, dass Entwicklung von innen kommen muss, einschließlich einer austarierten Bevölkerungspolitik. Die meisten Länder in Afrika verfolgen keine Politik der konsequenten Familien- und Geburtenplanung, sofern sie überhaupt eine haben. Die Ausbildungssysteme sind unzureichend, und es gibt jeweils ein christlich-muslemisches Umfeld, das Diskussionen zum Thema Bevölkerungspolitik, Familien- und Geburtenplanung unterläuft.

Erforderlich sind massive Investitionen in die Bildung, vor allem Investitionen in die Bildung von Mädchen, verbunden mit einer Familienplanungs- und Geburtenpolitik. Ferner stellt sich die Aufgabe, Jobs für Junge zu schaffen. Die Kirchen und die anderen religiösen Gemeinschaften müssen sich dem Dialog zum Bevölkerungswachstum dringender denn je stellen. Nur mit ihnen wird sich der deutliche Anstieg der afrikanischen Bevölkerungen verringern lassen, und nur mit ihnen wird es gelingen, die Gefahr von Bürgerkriegen zu mildern.

pdf Datei: Bevölkerung.Afrika.Malthus



Malthus, Thomas Robert (1970), An Essay on the Principle of Population, London.

UN (2015), World Population Prospects, New York, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf

Woellert, Franziska und Reiner Klingholz (2016), Jobs für Afrika Wie Nahrungsmittelproduktion und erneuerbare Energien Entwicklung beschleunigen können Berlin: Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, Discussion Paper 17, http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Jobs_fuer_Afrika/BI_JobsFuerAfrika_online.pdf


Zahlreiche Beiträge zu Afrika auf dem Blog Weltneuvermessung

Robert Kappel, Die große Transformation in Afrika? oder Dani Rodrik hat nicht immer recht


Robert Kappel, Vormachtstreben vs. Gerechtigkeit – Deutsche Afrikapolitik auf dem falschen Weg? Oder warum Perroux‘ Kritik des Vormachtkonzepts beachtet werden sollte, https://wordpress.com/post/weltneuvermessung.wordpress.com/235

Helmut Reisen, Wer finanziert Afrikas Infrastruktur?


Helmut Reisen, Afrikas Finanzierung im Gegenwind



[1] Woellert, Franziska und Reiner Klingholz (2016), Jobs für Afrika Wie Nahrungsmittelproduktion und erneuerbare Energien Entwicklung beschleunigen können Berlin: Berlin-Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, Discussion Paper 17, http://www.berlin-institut.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Jobs_fuer_Afrika/BI_JobsFuerAfrika_online.pdf

[2] Malthus, Thomas Robert (1970), An Essay on the Principle of Population, London.